In re: Jane Doe 22-B

Decision

In this decision, there was a unanimous ruling to affirm the trial court's rejection of Jane Doe 22-B's application to waive the consent of a legal guardian to get an abortion. The majority chose not to send it back to the trial court for further review, which caused a partial dissent.

The ruling reads:

"... we affirm the trial court's decision under the deferential standard of appellate review... We note that section allows for a remand to the trial court with instructions for a further ruling, but no such demand is warranted here."

All of the appellate judges felt it was out of their jurisdiction because the appellate courts are limited to overturning a trial court's ruling based on "abuse of discretion" by the trial judge. They did not see evidence of that in this case.

They also have the option to send it back to the trial court for a further review, known as remand. The majority didn't think this was appropriate because they felt the trial court's findings were clear and were not inadequate enough for a remand to be needed.

Partial Dissent: Judge Makar

"But the legislature has provided a specific tool for an appellate court to remand these types of cases to achieve clarity and completeness... I would remand for the three-day statutory period to clarify such matters, and dissent on that basis."

Makar agrees with the other judges that it was out of their jurisdiction to overturn the trial court's decision. But he disagrees that there isn't a reason to send it back to the trial court for further review. There are two main reasons he feels the trial court could gain more clarity.

First, he points out that the trial court's ruling was open-ended. In its decision, the trial court said it was willing to rethink its decision if Doe returned "at a later date, to adequately articulate her request". Makar believes the trial judge was conflicted because the additional stress from a recent death of Doe's friend may have effected Doe's decision.

Next, he identifies that Doe indicated in her application that her "guardian is fine with what [she] wants to do". If Doe's guardian legally waived their right to notification for 30 days, she would not need any further judicial intervention. The trial court ruling does not address this part of her application at all at all.

He also notes that he wishes Doe had not indicated in her application that she did not want legal counsel provided to her, which would have been free.